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Non-centralized recommendation-based decision making is a central feature of several social and technolog-
ical processes, such as market dynamics, peer-to-peer file-sharing and the web of trust of digital certification.
We investigate the properties of trust propagation on networks, based on a simple metric of trust transitivity. We
investigate analytically the percolation properties of trust transitivity in random networks with arbitrary degree
distribution, and compare with numerical realizations. We find that the existence of a non-zero fraction of abso-
lute trust (i.e. entirely confident trust) is a requirement for the viability of global trust propagation in large sys-
tems: The average pair-wise trust is marked by a discontinuous transition at a specific fraction of absolute trust,
below which it vanishes. Furthermore, we perform an extensive analysis of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web
of trust, in view of the concepts introduced. We compare different scenarios of trust distribution: community-
and authority-centered. We find that these scenarios lead to sharply different patterns of trust propagation, due
to the segregation of authority hubs and densely-connected communities. While the authority-centered scenario
is more efficient, and leads to higher average trust values, it favours weakly-connected “fringe” nodes, which
are directly trusted by authorities. The community-centered scheme, on the other hand, favours nodes with
intermediate degrees, in detriment of the authorities and its “fringe” peers.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Several social and technological systems rely on the notion
of trust, or recommendation, where agents must make their de-
cision based on the trustworthiness of other agents, with which
they interact. One example are buyers in markets [1, 2], who
may share among themselves their experiences with different
sellers, or lenders which may share a belief that a given bor-
rower will not be able to pay back [3]. Another example
are peer-to-peer file-sharing programs [2, 4], which often must
know, without relying on a central authority, which other pro-
grams act in a fair manner, and which act selfishly. In the same
line, an even more direct example is the web of trust of dig-
ital certification, such as the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) sys-
tem [5, 6], where regular individuals must certify the authen-
ticity of other individuals with digital signatures. In all these
systems, the agents lack global information, and must infer the
reliability of other agents, based solely on the opinion of trusted
peers, thus forming a network of trust. In this paper, we present
an analysis of trust propagation based on the notion of transi-
tivity: If agent a trusts agent b, and agent b trusts agent c, then,
to some extent, agent a will also trust agent c. Based on this
simple concept, we define a trust metric with which the relia-
bility of any reachable agent may be inferred. Instead of con-
centrating on the minutiae of trust propagation semantics, we
focus on the topological aspect of trust networks, using con-
cepts from network theory [7]. Using random networks as a
simple model, we investigate the necessary conditions for trust
to “percolate” through an entire system. We then apply the con-
cepts introduced to investigate in detail the PGP web of trust,
possibly the best “real” example of a trust propagation sys-
tem, which is completely accessible for investigation. We fo-
cus on the role of the strongly connected nodes in the network
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— the so called trust authorities — which represent a different
paradigm of trust delegation, in comparison to the decentralized
community-based approach, which is also heavily present in the
network.
This paper is divided as follows. In section II we define the
trust metric used; in section III we consider the problem of trust
percolation in random networks with different trust weight dis-
tributions. In in section IV we turn to the analysis of the PGP
network, and provide an extensive analysis of topology of the
PGP network, and of trust propagation according to different
trust distribution scenarios. Finally, in section V we provide
some final remarks and a conclusion.
II. TRUST METRIC
Trust is the measure of belief that a given entity will act as
one expects. It is often associated with positive, desirable at-
tributes, but it may not always be the case (e.g. one may have
trust that someone will act undesirably). Humans use trust to
make decisions when more direct information is unavailable.
In general, humans will decide their level of trust based on ar-
bitrary, heuristic rules, since there is no formal consensus on
how to evaluate trust. We will deliberately avoid the detailed
formalization of these rules, and instead rely on two simplifica-
tions: 1. We will treat trust simply as a probability that a given
assessment about an agent is true or false (e.g. fair/reliable or
not); 2. We further assume that this belief is transitive, i.e. if
agent a trust agent b, which in turn trusts agent c, then a will
also trust c, to some extent. This makes trust propagation easier
to analyse, while retaining the most intuitive properties of trust
propagation.
We will consider a system ofN agents which form a directed
trust network: Each agent v (represented by a vertex, or node)
has a number of interactions (represented by directed edges, or
links) with other agents {ui} for which a value cv,ui ∈ [0, 1] of
direct trust is defined a priori, and which can be interpreted as
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FIG. 1: Examples of trust networks: Left: A directed tree. Right:
A more realistic example. The edges in blue are the ones which con-
tribute to the value of trust from Bob to Alice, according to Eq. 6.
a probability. This value represents a direct experience agent v
had with ui, which is not inferred from any other agent. We then
define the inferred trust tij ∈ [0, 1] from agent i to any agent
j, which is somehow based on the values of cv,ui . In a simple
situation where there is only one possible path between any two
given nodes (i.e. the network is a directed tree, as the exam-
ple on the left in Fig. 1), one could simply multiply the values
of c along the single path to obtain t, e.g. tAlice,Bob = c1c3, in
the example of Fig. 1. In general, however, the situation may
be more complicated, as in the example on the right of Fig. 1,
where there is a variety of possible (often “contradictory”) tran-
sitive paths between most pairs of nodes. Perhaps the simplest
way of defining a trust metric would be to consider only the best
transitivity path between two nodes, i.e., the one where the trust
transitivity is maximum,
su,v = max
∏{ei} cei
 , ∀ {ei} ∈ Pu v, (1)
where Pu v is the set of all paths from u to v, {ei} is the set
of edges in a given path, and ce is the direct trust associated
with a given edge. This definition is an attractive one, since
it corresponds directly to the concept of minimum distance on
weighted graphs, which is defined as the sum of weights along
the path with the smallest sum. This is easily seen by noticing
that
∏
{ei} cei = exp{
∑
{ei} ωei}, with ωei = − ln cei ≥ 0
being the edge weights (with the special value of ωei = ∞
if cei = 0). However, it is clear that this approach leads to
an optimistic bias, since the best path obviously favors large
values of trust, and uses only a small portion of the informa-
tion available in the network. As an illustration consider the
network on the right of Fig. 1, where the value of sAlice,Bob is
1×0.9×0.6 = 0.54, via Dave and Chuck. However, if Chuck is
directly consulted, the transitivity drops to 0.3× 0.6 = 0.18. In
principle, there is no reason to prefer any of the two assessments
over the other. One may attempt to rectify this by considering
instead all possible paths between two nodes,
t˜u,v =
∑
u v
ωu v
∏
e∈u v
ce∑
u v
ωu v
, (2)
where ωu v is a weight associated with a given path u v. It
should be chosen to minimize the effect of a very large number
of paths with very low values of trust, without introducing an
optimistic bias on the final trust value. One apparently good
choice is to consider the transitivity value of the path itself, but
not including the last edge,
ωu v =
∏
e∈u v
ce + (1− ce)δ(e, e→v), (3)
where e→v is the last edge in the path, and δ is the Kronecker
delta. Not only this avoids a bias in the final value of t˜u,v , but
also ωu v has a simple interpretation as being the value of trust
on the final recommendation, which is completed by the last
edge. While this may seem reasonable, and uses all available
information in the network, it has two major drawbacks: 1. It
is very computationally costly to consider all possible paths be-
tween two nodes, even in moderately sized networks. It would
represent an unreasonable effort on part of the agents to use all
this information. 2. Computed as in Eq. 2, the value of t˜u,v has
the unsettling behaviour of tending to zero, whenever the num-
ber of paths become large (as they often are), even when paths
are differently weighted. Consider a simple scenario where the
network is a complete graph, i.e. all possible edges in the net-
work exist, and all of them have the same direct trust value c.
Since there are
(
N−2
l
)
l! paths of length l + 1 between any two
vertices, the value of inferred trust between any two nodes can
be calculated as
t˜u,v =
∑N−2
l=0
(
N−2
l
)
l!c2l+1∑N−2
l=0
(
N−2
l
)
l!cl
(4)
≤ cN−1 exp
(
1
c2
− 1
c
)
, (5)
from which it is easy to see that limN→∞ t˜u,v = 0 for c < 1.
This is an undesired behavior, since one would wish that such
highly connected topologies (which often occur as subgraphs of
social networks, known as cliques) would result in higher val-
ues of trust. In order to compensate for this one would have to
use a more aggressive weighting of the possible paths. We pro-
pose the following modification, which combines some features
of both previous approaches: Instead of considering all possi-
ble paths, we consider only those with the largest weights to all
the in-neighbours of the target vertex, as shown in Fig. 2. This
leads to a trust metric defined as
tu,v =
∑
w Aw,v
(
s
G\{v}
u,w
)2
cw,v∑
w Aw,vs
G\{v}
u,w
, (6)
where the path weights are the best trust transitivity to the in-
neighbours, sG\{v}u,w , which are calculated after removing the tar-
get vertex from the graph (so that it cannot influence its own
trust). We call this trust metric pervasive trust, and it corre-
sponds to the intuitive strategy of searching for the nodes with
a direct interaction with the target node (the final arbitrators),
and weighting their opinions according to the best possible trust
transitivity leading to them. It can be seen that this definition
does not suffer form the same problems of Eq. 2, again by con-
sidering the same complete graph example, with uniform direct
trust c. Since in this situation every target vertex has N − 2
in-neighbours different from the source, and the shortest path to
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the paths used to calculate tu,v according to
Eq. 6. The vertices wi are the in-neighbours of v, and the values si =
s
G\{v}
u,wi are the values of best trust (Eq. 1) from u to wi, with vertex v
removed from the graph.
each of these in-neighbours is of length one, the value of perva-
sive trust can be easily calculated as
tu,v =
(N − 2)c3 + c
(N − 2)c+ 1 , (7)
which converges to tu,v ≈ c2 for N  1. Thus the indirect
opinions with value c2 dominate the direct trust value c, but the
inferred value does not vanish, as with the definition of Eq. 2.
Considering again the example on the right of Fig. 1, we obtain
the value tAlice,Bob = (0.92 × 0.6 + (0.9× 0.7)2 × 0.3)/(0.9 +
0.9 × 0.7) ≈ 0.4, from the edges outlined in blue in the fig-
ure. Additionally, the definition of pervasive trust works as one
would expect in the trivial example on the left of Fig. 1, where
su,v and tu,v have the same values.
We note that the numerical computation of su,v can be done
by using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [8, 9], which has
a complexity of O(N logN). Thus the entire matrix su,v can
be calculated in O(N2 logN) time. The same algorithm can
be used to calculate tu,v , but since each target vertex needs to
be removed from the graph, and thus a new search needs to be
made for each different target, this results inO(N3 logN) time.
It is possible to improve this by performing searches in the re-
versed graph, i.e., for each target vertex v, the contribution to
tu,v from all sources u can be calculated simultaneously, after
v is removed, by performing a single reversed search from each
of the in-neighbours of v to each source u. This way, the en-
tire tu,v matrix can be computed in O(kN2 logN) time (where
k = E/N is the average degree of the network), which is com-
parable to the computation time of su,v for sparse graphs.
A. Comparison with other trust metrics
Other trust metrics have been proposed in the literature,
mainly by computer scientists, seeking to formalize the notion
of trust in peer-to-peer computer systems. Some are quite de-
tailed, like the usage of subjective logic by Jøsang et al [10],
and others are comparable with the simplistic approach taken
in this work, such as Eigentrust [4] and more recently Trust-
WebRank [11]. These last metrics are based on the notion of
feedback centrality [9], which are calculated by solving some
linear system. The Eigentrust metric requires the trust network
to be a stochastic matrix (i.e. the sum of the trust values of
the out-edges of all vertices must sum to unity) and the in-
ferred trust values are given by the steady state distribution of
the corresponding Markov chain (i.e. the left eigenvector of the
stochastic matrix with unity eigenvalue, hence the name of the
metric). Thus the inferred trust values are global properties, in-
dependent of any source vertex (i.e. non-personalized), which
is non-intuitive. Additionally, the requirement that the trust net-
work is stochastic means that only relative values of trust are
measured, and the absolute information is lost. Furthermore,
such an approach is strongly affected by the presence of loops
in the network, which get counted multiple times, which is also
non-intuitive as far as trust transitivity is concerned. The met-
ric TrustWebRank [11] tries to fix some of these problems by
borrowing ideas from the PageRank [12] algorithm, resulting
in a metric which also requires a stochastic matrix, but is per-
sonalised. However, in order for the algorithm to converge, it
depends on the introduction of an damping factor which elimi-
nates the contribution of longer paths in the network, indepen-
dently of its trust value. This is an a priori assumption that these
paths are not relevant, and may not correspond to reality. Addi-
tionally, the strange role of loops in the network is the same as
in the Eigentrust metric. However, since there is no consensus
on how a trust propagates, and the notion of trust lacks a formal,
universally accepted definition, in the end there is no “correct”
or “wrong” metric. We only emphasize that our approach is de-
rived directly from the simple notion of trust transitivity, is easy
to interpret, propagates absolute values of trust, and makes no
assumption whatsoever about the network topology, and direct
trust distribution.
III. TRUST PERCOLATION
Trust transitivity is based on the multiplication of direct trust
values, which may tend to be low if the paths become long.
Therefore, it is a central problem to determine if the trust transi-
tivity between two randomly chosen vertices of a large network
vanishes if the system becomes very large. This provides impor-
tant information about the viability of trust transitivity on large
systems. As a simple network model, we will consider random
directed networks with arbitrary degree distributions [13]. We
will also suppose that the direct trust values in the range be-
tween c and c+ dc will be independently distributed with prob-
ability ρc(c)dc, where ρc(c) is an arbitrary distribution. The
objective of this section is to calculate the average best trust
transitivity 〈s〉, given by Eq. 1, and the average pervasive trust
〈t〉, Eq. 6, between randomly chosen pairs of source and target
vertices. In random networks, the value of average pervasive
trust will be given simply as 〈t〉 = 〈s〉 〈c〉, since the best paths
to the in-neighbours of a given vertex are uncorrelated, and the
probability that they pass through the node itself tend to zero,
in the limit of large network size. Therefore we need only to
concern ourselves with the average best trust transitivity 〈s〉.
Networks are composed of components of different types and
sizes: For each vertex there will be an out-component, which
is the set of vertices reachable from it, and an in-component,
which is the set of vertices for which it is reachable. A max-
imal set of vertices which are mutually reachable is called a
strongly connected component. Random graphs often display a
phase transition in the size and number of these components: If
the number of edges is large enough, there will be the sudden
4formation of a giant (in-, out-, strongly connected) component,
which spans a non-vanishing fraction of the network [7, 13].
The existence of these giant components is obviously necessary
for a non-vanishing value of trust to exist between most ver-
tices, but it is not sufficient, since it is still necessary that the
multiplication of direct trust values along most shortest paths
do not become vanishingly small. As an illustration, consider
a sparse graph (i.e. with finite average degree), with an arbi-
trary degree distribution. In the situation where there is a suf-
ficiently large giant out-component in the graph, the average
shortest path from a randomly chosen root vertex to the rest of
the network is given approximately [13] by
l ≈ ln(N/ 〈k〉)
ln(〈k2〉 / 〈k〉) , (8)
independently of the out-degree distribution (as long as 〈k〉 and
〈k2〉 are finite positive), where N is the number of vertices,
〈k〉 is the average out-degree and 〈k2〉 is the average number
of second out-neighbours, and it is assumed that N  〈k〉
and 〈k2〉  〈k〉 [24]. Since the edges are weighted, the av-
erage length of the best paths can differ from l, but can never
be smaller. Thus, an upper bound on the average best trust
is given by 〈s〉 = o(max {ci}l), where max {ci} is the max-
imum value of direct trust in the network. In the situation
where max {ci} < 1, we have that limN→∞ 〈s〉 = o(0), since
limN→∞ l = ∞. Therefore, if there are no values of c = 1
in the network, the average trust will always be zero in sparse
networks. The only possible strategies for non-vanishing values
of average trust is either to have a non-zero fraction of c = 1
(which we will call absolute trust), or for the network to be
dense, such that l remains finite for N →∞.
With the above consideration in mind, we now move to
calculate the average trust transitivity values. For that we
modify the generating function method used in [13] to obtain
the distribution of component sizes. The objective is to obtain
a self-consistency condition for the distribution of best trust
transitivity values by describing the direct neighbourhood
of a single vertex, which is based on the following observa-
tion: A randomly chosen vertex u with out-neighbours wi,
each with direct trust from u given by ci, will trust another
randomly chosen vertex v with a best trust transitivity value
of s+ only if max(cis+i ) = s
+, where s+i is the best trust
transitivity from wi to v. In a random network which is
sufficiently large, s+ and s+i should both be drawn from
the same distribution ρ+s (s). This gives a self-consistency
condition for ρ+s (s) which is given schematically as follows,
s = s+u+
=
s+1 u
+
c 1
s+1 c1 = s
+
+
s+1 u
+
c
1
s+2 u
+
c 2
max{s+i ci} = s+
+
s+1 u
+
c
1
s+2 u
+
c 2
s+3 u
+
c 3
max{s+i ci} = s+
+ · · ·
where each term corresponds to the probability of the vertex
having a given number of out-neighbours, and the maximum
best trust transitivity being equal the desired value. Note
that we have explicitly multiplied every instance of s+ with
a arbitrary free variable u+, which cannot be determined by
the above self-consistency alone, and has to be described
separately. Each term on the right is weighted by the out-
degree probability pk. In terms of the cumulative distribution
ρ˜+s (s) =
∫ s
0
duρ+s (u), this self-consistency can be expressed as
ρ˜+s (s) =
∑
k
pk[β˜
+(s)]k, (9)
where β˜+(x) is the cumulative probability that s+c < x, with
c distributed by ρc(c), given by
β˜+(s) =
∫ 1
0
dxρc(x)ρ˜
+
s (s/x). (10)
The distribution ρ+s (s) above does not equal ρs(s), due to the
remaining variable u+, for which one must still find an appro-
priate distribution. This last piece is obtained by realizing that
ρs(s) must also be subject to a complementary self-consistency
condition in the opposite direction, following the in-neighbours:
A randomly chosen vertex u with in-neighbours wi, each with
direct trust to u given by ci, will be trusted by another ran-
domly chosen vertex u with a best trust value of s− only if
max(cis
−
i ) = s
−, where s−i is the best trust from wi to u. This
results in an entirely analogous self-consistency condition for
ρ−s (s), where the out-degree distribution pk is replaced by the
in-degree distribution pj . Since this last self-consistency is also
complete up to a free variable u−, we can formulate the ansatz
that u+ = s− and u− = s+, such that
s = s+s−. (11)
With this connection it is possible to obtain ρs(s) as
ρs(s) =
∫ 1
0
duρ+s (u)ρ
−
s (s/u)/u, or (12)
=
∫ 1
0
duρ+s (s/u)ρ
−
s (u)/u, (13)
and the average 〈s〉 more directly as
〈s〉 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
ds−ds+s−s+ρ−s (s
−)ρ+s (s
+) (14)
=
〈
s−
〉 〈
s+
〉
. (15)
By rewriting Eq. 9 in terms of the generating functions of the
in- and out-degree distributions,
G(z) =
∑
j
pjz
j F (z) =
∑
k
pkz
k, (16)
one obtains the self-consistency equations in a more compact
form,
ρ˜−s (s) = F (β˜
−(s)) (17)
ρ˜+s (s) = G(β˜
+(s)). (18)
These are integral equations, for which there are probably no
general closed form solutions. However, it is possible to solve
them numerically by successive iterations from an initial dis-
tribution, which we chose as ρ˜0(s) = Θ(s − 1), where Θ(x)
is the Heaviside step function. From the numerical solutions
the average values can be obtained as 〈s−〉 = ∫ 1
0
dsρ−s (s)s =
51 − ∫ 1
0
dsρ˜−s (s) (where the last expression is obtained by inte-
gration by parts), and in analogous fashion for 〈s+〉. The aver-
age value of best trust transitivity 〈s〉 is then given by Eq. 15.
We turn now to the conditions necessary for non-vanishing
average trust transitivity. Both Eqs. 17 and 18 accept the trivial
solution ρ˜−/+s (s) = Θ(s), which corresponds to ρ
−/+
s (s) =
δ(s), i.e. the average best trust is zero. As discussed previously,
for other solutions to be possible, we need to consider a non-
vanishing fraction of edges with absolute trust c = 1 in the
network. Here we will consider direct trust distributions of the
form,
ρc(c) = γδ(c− 1) + (1− γ)ρ′c(c), (19)
which correspond to a fraction γ of edges with c = 1, and a
complementary fraction (1 − γ) with c given with probability
density ρ′c(c). We will consider two different versions of ρ
′
c(c):
A uniform distribution ρ′c(c) = 1, and a single-valued distribu-
tion ρ′c(c) = δ(c− η), with η = 1/2. We will use two different
degree distributions, the Poisson and Zipf [25], and their respec-
tive generating functions,
pj =
〈j〉j e−〈j〉
j!
G(z) = e〈j〉(z−1) (20)
pj =
j−τ
ζ(τ)
G(z) =
Liτ (z)
ζ(τ)
, (21)
where ζ(τ) is the Riemann ζ function, and Lin(x) is the nth
polylogarithm of x. For simplicity, we will consider only the
situation where pj = pk, and both j and k are independently
distributed. In Fig. 3 are plotted the values of 〈s〉 and 〈t〉, as a
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FIG. 3: Average values of best trust 〈s〉 and pervasive trust 〈t〉 as
a function of the fraction of edges with absolute trust γ. Top left:
Networks with Poisson in- and out-degree distributions, and uniform
trust distribution. Top right and bottom right: Poisson distribution,
and single-valued trust distribution. Bottom left: Zipf distribution, and
single-valued trust distribution. Solid lines correspond to analytical
solutions, and symbols to numerical realizations of several networks
of different sizes: 104 (red), 105 (green) and 106 (blue) nodes. The
dashed line shows the average direct trust 〈c〉 = (γ + 1)/2.
function of γ, for the different distributions. It is also compared
with numerical computations on actual network realizations of
different sizes. The main feature observed is a first-order tran-
sition from vanishing trust to positive trust, at specific values
of γ. The transition values γ∗ correspond exactly to the crit-
ical values of the formation of a giant component of the in-
duced subgraph composed only of edges with c = 1, which
has average degree γ 〈k〉 [13]. For graphs with Poisson degree
distribution, this corresponds to γ∗ = 1/ 〈k〉. It is worth ob-
serving that on finite graphs, the average trust does not vanish
very rapidly, and is still non-zero for relatively large networks
with N = 106 nodes, even when γ = 0. This is attributed to
the so-called small-world effect where the average shortest path
scales slowly as l ∼ lnN , as in Eq. 8. Therefore in practical
situations where networks are large but finite, γ > γ∗ it is not a
strictly necessary condition for system-wide trust propagation.
Another interesting feature is the behaviour of the average trust
in graphs with Zipf degree distribution. There, the transition to
positive trust is of second order, and the critical points are also
γ = 1/ 〈k〉. Additionally, the values of average trust are smaller
than in networks with Poisson degree distribution and the same
average degree, for intermediary values of γ after the transi-
tions. This is due to the smaller path multiplicity of graphs with
scale-free distribution: Even though the average shortest path
length is smaller in such graphs, the number of alternative paths
is also smaller, due to the dominance of vertices with smaller
degree. Thus, if the shortest path happens to have a small trust
value, there will be a higher probability there will not be an al-
ternative path. In Fig. 3 it is shown also the average best trust
for 1 < τ < 2, for which the average degree diverges. For such
dense networks, the values of 〈s〉 are above zero for all values of
γ > 0, which is simply due to the fact that the average shortest
path length does not diverge in this case.
IV. THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY (PGP) NETWORK
In this section we investigate trust propagation on the Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) network. In a broad manner PGP (or more
precisely the OpenPGP standard [14]) refers to a family of com-
puter programs for encryption and decryption of files, as well
as data authentication, i.e. generation and verification of dig-
ital signatures. It is often used to sign, encrypt and decrypt
email. It implements a scheme of public-key cryptography [15],
where the keys used for encryption/decryption are split in two
parts, one private and one public. Both parts are related in way,
such that the private key is used exclusively for decryption and
creation of signatures, and the public key only for encryption
and signature verification. Thus any user is capable of send-
ing encrypted messages and verifying the signature of a spe-
cific user with her public key, but only this user can decrypt
these messages and generate signatures, using her private key,
which she should never disclose. The public keys are usually
published in so-called key servers, which mutually synchronize
their databases, and thus become global non-centralized repos-
itories of public keys. However, the mere existence of public
key in a key server, associated with a given identity (usually a
name and an email address) is no guarantee that this key really
belongs to the respective person, since there is no inherent ver-
ification in the submission process. This problem is solved by
6the implementation of the so-called web of trust of PGP keys,
whereby a user can attach a signature to the public key of an-
other user, indicating she trusts that this key belongs to its al-
leged owner. The validity of a given key can then be inferred
by transitivity, in a self-organized manner, without the required
presence of a central trust authority. As such, this system repre-
sents an almost perfect example of a trust propagation through
transitivity.
As a rule, key signatures should only be made after careful
verification, which usually requires the two parties to physically
meet. Such a requirement transforms the web of trust into a
snapshot of a global social network of acquaintances, since the
vast majority of keys correspond to human users, which tend to
sign keys of people with which they normally interact. There
is also a tendency to sign keys (upon verification) from people
which do not belong to a close circle of acquaintances, with
the sole purpose of strengthening the web of trust with more
connections. This tendency is well reflected by the so-called
“key signing parties”, where participants meet (usually after a
large technological conference) to massively sign each other’s
keys [16]. Thus the structure of the PGP network reflects the
global dynamics of self-organization of human peers in a social
context.
This section is divided in two parts. In the first part we
present some aspects of the topology and temporal organization
of the network. In the second part we analyze the trust transi-
tivity in the network, in view of the trust metric we discussed
previously.
A. Network topology
The PGP network used in this work was obtained from a
snapshot of the globally synchronized SKS key servers [26] in
November 2009. It is composed of N ≈ 2.5 × 106 keys and
E ≈ 7 × 105 signatures with a very low average degree of
〈j〉 = 0.28. This means that many keys are isolated and con-
tain no signatures. Therefore we will concentrate on the largest
strongly connected component, i.e. a maximal set of vertices
for which there is a path between any pair of vertices in the
set. The number of vertices N ≈ 4 × 104 in this component is
much smaller, but the network is much denser, with on average
〈j〉 ≈ 7.58 signatures per key (see summarized data in table I).
It represents the de facto web of trust, since the rest of the net-
work is so sparsely connected that no trust transitivity can be
inferred from it. We note that keys may have multiple “sub-
keys” which correspond to different identities (usually different
email addresses from the same person) and which can individ-
ually sign other subkeys. For simplicity, in this work we have
collapsed subkeys into single keys, and possible multiple sig-
natures into a single signature. We have also discarded invalid,
and revoked keys and signatures.
The number of keys and signatures in the strongly connected
component has been increasing over time, as shown in Fig. 4.
The number of keys (which are now valid) was approximately
the same for some time and then slightly decreased for a period
up to around 2002, and has been increasing with an approxi-
mately constant rate since then. We note that the number of
keys may decrease since keys can expire or be revoked. The
N E 〈j〉 r a c
2513677 703142 ≈ 0.28 0.45 −0.02152(12) 0.02321(9)
39796 301498 ≈ 7.58 0.69 0.0332(3) 0.461(2)
TABLE I: Summary of statistics for the whole PGP network (above)
and the largest strongly connected component (below). N is the num-
ber of vertices (keys), andE is the number of edges (signatures), 〈j〉 is
the average in-degree, r is the average reciprocity, a is the assortativity
coefficient and c is the average clustering coefficient.
number of signatures, on the other hand, seems to be increas-
ing with an accelerated rate, which is approximately constant,
and similar to the rate of growth of the number of keys. This
means that the average degree of the network is increasing with
time, as can be seen in Fig. 4. Keys and signatures grow in
an organized manner, as shown by the waiting time distribution
between the creation of two subsequent keys or signatures, as
shown in Fig. 4. These distributions are broad for several orders
of magnitude, from the order of seconds to days, approximately
following a power-law in this region. The fact that keys and
signatures are often created only seconds apart, and the wait-
ing time distribution lacks any discernible characteristic scale,
except for a cut-off at large times (∼ 1 day), shows that the net-
work does not grow in a purely random fashion (which would
generate exponentially-distributed waiting times), and serves as
a signature of an underlying organized growth process.
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We will characterize the topology of the network by its de-
gree distribution and nearest-neighbours degree correlations, as
well as other standard network measures such as clustering [17],
reciprocity [18] and community structure [19]. We will pay
special attention to the most highly connected vertices, some
of which correspond to so-called certificate authorities and dis-
7play a distinct connectivity pattern, which has a special meaning
for trust propagation.
The network has very heterogeneous degree distributions, as
can be seen in Fig. 5, with some keys having on the order of
103 signatures. They are possibly compatible with a power-law
with exponent ∼ 2.5 for large degrees, but the distributions are
not broad enough for a precise identification. The number of
signatures on a given key (the in-degree) and the number of sig-
natures made by a the same key (the out-degree) are strongly
correlated, as can be seen in Fig. 6, which shows the average
out-degree 〈k〉 as a function of the in-degree j. This is explained
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by the high reciprocity of the edges in the network, i.e. if a key
a signs a key b, there is a very high probability that key b signs
key a as well. This is easy to understand, since key verifica-
tion usually requires physical presence, and both parties take
the opportunity to mutually verify each other keys in the same
encounter. The edge reciprocity [18] is quantified as the frac-
tion r = n↔e /E, where n
↔
e is the number of reciprocal edges
and E is the total number of edges in the network. The PGP
network has a high value of r = 0.69. The reciprocity is dis-
tributed in a slightly heterogeneous fashion across the network,
as is shown in Fig. 6, where is plotted the average reciprocity of
the edges as a function of the in- and out-degrees of the source
vertex. It can be seen that the keys with very few signatures
tend to act in a very reciprocal manner, whereas the more pro-
lific signers receive less signatures back. This heterogeneity is
further amplified when one considers the degree correlation be-
tween nearest-neighbours, as shown in Fig. 5, where it is plotted
the average in- and out-degree, 〈j〉nn and 〈k〉nn, of the nearest
out-neighbours of the vertices in the network, as a function of
the in- and out-degree of the source vertex, j and k. The de-
gree correlation shows an assortative regime for intermediary
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FIG. 6: Left: Average out-degree as a function of the in-degree of the
same vertex. Right: Average edge reciprocity, as a function of the in
or out-degree of the source vertex.
degree values (∼ 10 – 40), meaning that vertices with higher
degrees are connected preferentially with other vertices with
high degree, but also some dissortative features for vertices with
very high and very low degrees, where vertices with low degree
are connected preferentially with vertices with high degree, and
vice versa. This mixed connectivity pattern leads to a very low
scalar assortativity coefficient [27] of a = 0.0332(3), which
is unusual for social networks [20]. These differences become
more clear when one investigates more closely the keys with
the largest degree in the network, as it is shown in table II. As
with the rest of the network, most of the largest keys belong to
individuals, with the exception of the first and third keys with
the most signatures, which belong to entities. These entities are
known as certificate authorities and are created by organiza-
tions with the intent of centralizing certification. The largest au-
thority is the community-driven CAcert.org which issues digital
certificates of various kinds to the public, free of charge [28].
The second largest authority is the German magazine c’t, which
initiated a PGP certification campaign in 1997 [29] . These au-
thorities interact with individuals in a different manner, acting
as a central mediator between loosely connected peers. This
is evident by the low clustering coefficient (c ≈ 0.003), which
is one order of magnitude lower than the other (human) hubs
(c ∼ 0.05 – 0.11), and the average in-degree of their out-
neighbours, which is also significantly smaller than their human
counterparts (∼ 17 vs. 60 – 80, respectively). These differ-
ent patterns represent distinct paradigms of trust organization:
Authority vs. Community-based; each with its set of advan-
tages and disadvantages. An authority-based scenario relies on
few universally trusted vertices which mediate all trust prop-
agation. In this way, the responsibility of key verification is
concentrated heavily on these vertices, which reduces the total
amount of verification necessary, and is thus more efficient. The
most obvious disadvantage is that the authorities represent cen-
tral points of failure: if an authority itself is not trusted, neither
will be the keys it certifies. Additionally, this approach may in-
crease the probability of forgery, since only one party needs to
be deceived in order for global trust to be achieved. The com-
plementary scenario is the community-based approach, where
densely-connected clusters of vertices provide certification for
each other. This obviously requires more diligence from the
participants, but has the advantage of larger resilience against
errors, since the multiplicity of different paths between vertices
is much larger. In the PGP network both these paradigms seem
to be present simultaneously, as can be observed in detail by ex-
tracting its community structure [19]. This is done by obtaining
8Key ID Name j k 〈j〉out c Date
D2BB0D0165D0FD58 CA Cert Signing Authority (Root CA) <gpg@cacert.org> 965 1507 17.5(8) 0.0031 2003-07-11
2F951508AAE6022E Karlheinz Geyer (TUD) <geyerk.fv.tu@nds.tu-darmstadt.de> 661 744 59(2) 0.0660 2004-12-07
DBD245FCB3B2A12C ct magazine CERTIFICATE <pgpCA@ct.heise.de> 597 1348 18.3(12) 0.0033 1999-05-11
69D2A61DE263FCD4 Kurt Gramlich <kurt@skolelinux.de> 406 644 71(3)) 0.0807 2002-10-17
948FD6A0E10F502E Marcus Frings <protagonist@gmx.net> 387 381 82(5) 0.1110 2002-03-22
29BE5D2268FD549F Martin Michlmayr <tbm@cyrius.com> 385 436 56(4) 0.0499 1999-08-04
566D362CEE0977E8 Jens Kubieziel <jens@kubieziel.de> 369 414 73(4) 0.1098 2002-08-23
3F101691D98502C5 Elmar Hoffmann <elho@elho.net> 352 1 348 0.1122 2005-02-17
957952D7CF3401A9 Elmar Hoffmann <elho@elho.net> 348 311 84(5) 0.1086 2005-02-17
CE8A79D798016DC7 Josef Spillner <josef@coolprojects.org> 344 429 71(4) 0.1007 2001-05-22
89CD4B21607559E6 Benjamin Hill (Mako) <mako@atdot.cc> 325 319 70(5) 0.0801 2000-07-13
TABLE II: The eleven keys with the largest number of signatures in the network, their respective in-degree i, out-degree j, average in-degree of
the nearest out-neighbours 〈j〉out, clustering coefficient c, and date of creation.
the community partition of the network which maximizes the
modularity Q of the network, defined as
Q =
1
2E
∑
i6=j
[
Aij − kikj
2E
]
δ(si, sj), (22)
where E is the total number of edges, Aij is the adjacency ma-
trix of the network, ki is the degree of vertex i, si is the commu-
nity label of vertex i and δ is the Kronecker delta. According to
this definition, a partition with high values of Q is possible for
networks with densely-connected groups of vertices, with fewer
connections between different groups. The maximum value of
Q = 1 is achieved only for "perfect" partitions of extremely
segregated communities. We note that the above definition is
meaningful only for undirected graphs, and thus we apply it to
the undirected version of PGP network, where the direction of
the edges is ignored. We used the method of Reichardt et al [21]
to obtain the best partition, which resulted in modularity value
of Q ≈ 0.73. As a comparison, we computed the modularity
for a shuffled version of the network, where the edges were ran-
domly placed, but the degrees of the vertices were preserved,
which resulted in the significantly smaller value Q ≈ 0.03.
The distribution of community sizes seems to have a power-
law tail with exponent ∼ 2.3 (∼ 3.8 for the shuffled network),
characterizing a scale-free structure. By isolating the individual
communities, one can clearly see strong differences between
those in the vicinity of the certificate authorities and “regular”
communities. In Fig. 7 is shown two representative examples
of these two types of communities: On top is the community
around the CAcert.org certificate authority, and is composed of
677 keys, with an average 6.9 signatures per key. Its degree
distributions are shown on the side, from which the large dis-
crepancy between the most central vertex and the rest of the
community can be observed. The colors on the vertices corre-
spond to the Top-Level Domain (TLD) of the email addresses
associated with each key, and serve as an indication of the geo-
graphical proximity of the individuals. For the community con-
taining CAcert.org, a high degree of geographical heterogene-
ity is present. This is corroborated also by the fact that there
are fewer direct edges between individuals. On the bottom of
Fig. 7 it is shown a community composed almost exclusively
of keys with Austrian email addresses (.at TLD) which show a
completely different pattern, lacking any central authority. It is
smaller, with 287 keys, but denser, with 10 signatures per key.
This pattern is repeated for most of the largest communities in
the graph. Some non-centralized communities have a broader
degree distribution than the Austrian community, but only those
associated with certificate authorities display a centralized pat-
tern such as in the top of Fig. 7.
We now turn to the trust propagation on the PGP network.
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9B. Trust transitivity
In order to properly investigate trust transitivity in the PGP
network, it is necessary to know the direct trust values associ-
ated with each signature, which indicate the level of scrutiny in
the key verification process. The OpenPGP standard [14] de-
fines four trust “classes” for signatures, according to the degree
of verification made. Unfortunately, these classes are univer-
sally ignored, and most signatures fall into the “generic” class,
from which no assertion can be made. Since the actual level of
verification of the keys is in fact unknown, we will investigate
hypothetical situations which represent different strategies the
PGP users may use to verify keys. In the last section we have
shown that the network is composed of different connection
patterns: community clusters and centralized trust authorities.
Depending on how these connection patterns are judged more
trustworthy, the values of transitive trust will be different. Here
we will consider three possible scenarios: 1. Random distribu-
tion, 2. Authority-centered trust, and 3. Community-centered
trust. In all situations we will consider that all signatures have
the same trust value of c = 1/2, except for a fraction γ of edges
which have absolute trust c = 1, which is selected as follows
for each situation:
1. Random: The γE edges are chosen randomly among all
E edges.
2. Authority-centered: The γE edges with the largest
betweenness [22] be are chosen, which is defined as
be =
∑
i 6=j
σij(e)
σij
, (23)
where σi,j is the number of shortest paths from vertex i
to j, and σij(e) is the number of these paths which con-
tain the edge e. This distribution favours edges adjacent
to nodes with high degree, and also edges which bridge
different communities.
3. Community-centered: The γE edges with the largest
edge clustering τe are chosen, which is defined as
τe =
∑
iAs(e),iAi,t(e)√
ks(e)jt(e)
, (24)
where s(e) and t(e) are the source and target vertices of
edge e, Ai,j is the adjacency matrix, and ji and ki are
the in- and out-degrees of vertex i, respectively. This
quantity measures the density of out-neighbours of the
s(e) which are also in-neighbours of t(e), and simulta-
neously the density of in-neighbours of t(e) which are
out-neighbours of s(e). This distribution favours edges
with belong to densely-connected communities. For in-
stance, the edges of a clique (i.e. a complete subgraph)
will all have the value τe = 1 − 1/(n − 1), where n is
the size of the clique, which will approach the maximum
value τe → 1 for a sufficiently large clique size.
In Fig. 8 it is shown the average best trust transitivity, Eq. 1
and average pervasive trust Eq. 6 for the PGP network, as a
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FIG. 8: Average best trust 〈s〉 and pervasive trust 〈t〉, as a function of
the fraction of edges with absolute trust γ, for the PGP network. The
different curves correspond to the different trust distribution scenarios
described in the text.
function of γ according to the different approaches. We note
that, due to the relatively small size of the network, no discon-
tinuous transition is seen. The authority-centered trust leads to
significantly higher values of 〈s〉 and 〈t〉, and the community-
based distribution to the lowest values. This is expected, since
distributing trust according to the edge betweenness essentially
optimizes trust transitivity, putting the highest values along the
shortest paths between vertices. The community-centered ap-
proach does exactly the opposite, favoring intra-community
connections, and results in the lowest values of average trust.
Thus, favoring the hubs and authorities is clearly more efficient,
if the objective is solely to increase the average trust in the net-
work. However, pure efficiency may not be what is desired,
since it relies in the opinion of a much smaller set of vertices,
which eases the job of dishonest parties, which need only to
convince these vertices in order to be trusted by a large portion
of the network. Some of these issues become more clear by
observing how nodes with different degrees receive trust with
each of these strategies, as show in Fig. 9. For random distri-
bution of trust, the vertices with higher degree receive a nat-
ural bias in the values of average best in-trust, 〈s〉, since the
shortest paths leading to them tend to be smaller. But the fair
nature of the definition of t compensates for this, and the val-
ues of 〈t〉 are almost independent of the in-degree of the ver-
tices. The highly connected nodes become more trusted only
with the authority-centred approach. Interestingly, in this sit-
uation the nodes with the smallest degrees also receive a large
value of trust, since most of them are “fringe” nodes connected
only with the hubs (see Fig. 5). The vertices with intermediary
degrees are thus left in the limbo, and are in effect penalized for
their community pattern. The almost symmetrically opposite
situation is obtained with the community-centered trust distri-
bution, where both the vertices with smallest and largest degrees
receive the smallest trust values, and the intermediary nodes are
judged more trustworthy due to their strong communities. We
note that this effect is not due simply to the way the values of
trust are distributed, but depend strongly on the existence of
communities in the network. This is evident when the same
trust distribution is applied to a shuffled version of the network,
with the same degree sequence, as is shown in Fig. 9. For such
a network, the community structure disappears, and the highly
connected nodes come again in the lead.
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FIG. 9: Average best trust 〈s〉 and pervasive trust 〈t〉, as a function of the in-degree j and the fraction of edges with absolute trust γ, for the PGP
network. The different plots correspond to the different trust distribution scenarios described in the text: (a) Random distribution, (b) authority-
centered distribution and (c) community-centered distribution. The plots (d) correspond to a community-centered distribution, done on a shuffled
version of network, with the same degree sequence.
V. CONCLUSION
We investigated properties of trust propagation on network
based on the notion of trust transitivity. We defined a trust met-
ric, called pervasive trust which provides inferred trust values
for pairs of nodes, based on a network of direct trust values. The
metric extends trust transitivity to the situation where multiple
paths between source and target exist, by combining the best
trust transitivity to the in-neighbours of a given target node, and
their direct trust to the target. The trust values so-obtained are
unbiased, personalized and well defined for any possible net-
work topology. Equipped with this metric we analyzed the con-
ditions necessary for global trust propagation in large systems,
using random networks with arbitrary degree distributions as a
simple model. We analytically obtained the average best trust
transitivity (as well as pervasive trust) as a function of the frac-
tion γ of edges with absolute trust c = 1. We found that there is
a specific value of γ = γ∗, below which the average trust is al-
ways zero. For γ ≥ γ∗ the average value jumps discontinuously
to a positive value.
Using the defined trust metric, we investigated trust propa-
gation in the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) network [5, 6]. We
gave an overview of the most important topological and dynam-
ical features of the PGP network, and identified mixed connec-
tivity patters which are relevant for trust propagation: namely
the existence of trust authorities and of densely-connected non-
centralized communities. Based on these distinct patterns, we
formulated different scenarios of direct trust distribution, and
compared the average inferred trust which results from them.
We found that an authority-centered approach, where direct
trust is given preferentially to nodes which are more central,
leads to a much larger average trust, but at the same time ben-
efits nodes at the fringe of the network, which are only con-
nected to the authority hubs, and for which no other information
is available. Symmetrically, a community-centered approach,
where edges belonging to densely-connected communities are
favoured with more trust, results in less overall trust, but both
the fringe nodes and the authorities receive significantly less
trust than average. These differences are not simply due to the
different ways the direct is distributed, but rather to the fact that
the dense communities and the trust authorities are somewhat
segregated. These differences illustrate the advantages and dis-
advantages of both paradigms of trust propagation, which seem
to be coexist in the PGP network. It also serves as an insight-
ful example of how dramatically the direct trust distribution can
influence the inferred trust, even when the underlying topology
remains the same.
In this work, we have concentrated on static properties of
trust propagation. However most trust-based systems are dy-
namic, and change according to some rules which are influ-
enced by the trust propagation itself. One particularly good ex-
ample is market dynamics [1–3] where sellers (or borrowers)
do not perform well if they have a poor track record, which will
be partially influenced by trust. Thus, it remains to be seen how
trust transitivity can be carried over to such types of models,
and what role it plays in shaping their dynamics.
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